Research

1. “Entry Regulation in the Presence of Reputation: Theory and Evidence” [Job market paper] 

 Presented at AEA 2026, Econometric Society DSE 2025, HKU Applied Group, 4th CAERE, Duke IO Lunch

 Abstract: Reliable provision of high-quality goods and services is a central challenge in emerging markets. Governments often rely on entry regulation to screen providers, while market-based reputation mechanisms can discipline quality through demand. This paper studies how reputation interacts with entry regulation and shape optimal regulatory policies using empirical, theoretical, and quantitative approaches. Empirically, I exploit a nationwide entry deregulation in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) industry as an exogenous shock and use an instrumental variables strategy to show that deregulation leads to a persistent decline in service quality. I also document that negative reputation shocks sharply reduce firms' market share, indicating that reputation is a powerful demand-side disciplining device. Theoretically, I develop a model of information asymmetry in which reputation partially substitutes for regulatory screening, weakening the quality-improving effect of entry barriers. Structurally, I estimate a dynamic oligopoly model within a Moment-based Markov Equilibrium framework that incorporates endogenous reputation formation. To measure service quality continuously, I build a plagiarism detection system to analyze a corpus of over forty thousand documents. Counterfactual simulations reveal that accounting for reputation substantially alters the optimal stringency and timing of entry regulations. These results underscore that effective regulation in emerging markets must be designed jointly with the market’s reputation forces.