Research

1. “Improving Quality through Regulation or Reputation? Theory and Evidence from Environmental Impact Assessment Industry” [Job market paper] 

 Presented at AEA 2026 (invited for a podcast interview), Econometric Society DSE 2025, HKU Applied Group, 4th CAERE, Duke IO Lunch

 Old name: “Entry Regulation in the Presence of Reputation: Theory and Evidence”

 Abstract: Ensuring reliable provision of high-quality goods and services remains a central challenge in many markets. This paper studies how reputation interacts with entry regulation and shapes optimal regulatory policies using empirical, theoretical, and quantitative approaches. Empirically, I show that an entry deregulation reform in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) industry leads to a persistent decline in service quality. I also document that negative reputation shocks sharply reduce firms' market share by half, indicating that both regulation and reputation are powerful devices. Theoretically, I develop a firm entry game in which reputation partially substitutes for regulatory screening, weakening the quality-improving effect of entry barriers. Structurally, I estimate a dynamic oligopoly model within a Moment-based Markov Equilibrium framework that incorporates endogenous reputation formation. Counterfactual simulations reveal that accounting for reputation substantially alters the optimal stringency and timing of entry regulations. These results underscore that effective regulation in emerging markets must be designed jointly with the market’s reputation forces.