Research

Abstract: China’s sudden lifting of zero-COVID controls in December 2022 triggered a nationwide mortality surge. Using verifiable death records of social elites, such as academicians and key political figures, we estimate a conservative lower bound on excess mortality during the exit wave. We find that elite weekly mortality rates rose 5–10-fold in the weeks following the reopening, implying at least 1.44 million excess deaths nationally. Nevertheless, further analysis reveals that China’s total mortality cost during the entire pandemic remains low relative to comparable countries, as COVID-19 was largely under control from 2020 to 2022. The deaths of social elites highlight the pandemic’s reach across all societal strata and have far-reaching impacts on society. Using academia as an example, we demonstrate that while the deaths of academicians result in significant losses of valuable expertise, those deaths enhance academic upward mobility and accelerate generational turnover. Our findings underscore the need for better preparedness in future public health emergencies.

Old name: “Entry Regulation in the Presence of Reputation: Theory and Evidence”

Abstract: Ensuring reliable provision of high-quality goods and services remains a central challenge in many markets. This paper studies how reputation interacts with entry regulation and shapes optimal regulatory policies using empirical, theoretical, and quantitative approaches. Empirically, I show that an entry deregulation reform in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) industry leads to a persistent decline in service quality. I also document that negative reputation shocks sharply reduce firms' market share by half, indicating that both regulation and reputation are powerful devices. Theoretically, I develop a firm entry game in which reputation partially substitutes for regulatory screening, weakening the quality-improving effect of entry barriers. Structurally, I estimate a dynamic oligopoly model within a Moment-based Markov Equilibrium framework that incorporates endogenous reputation formation. Counterfactual simulations reveal that accounting for reputation substantially alters the optimal stringency and timing of entry regulations. These results underscore that effective regulation in emerging markets must be designed jointly with the market’s reputation forces.

Abstract: This paper provides evidence that bribery demand plays a significant role in art valua-tion and art market dynamics. Specifically, we examine the phenomenon of “elegant corruption,” characterized by bribes concealed through the exchange of artwork gifts. Analyzing calligraphic artwork auction data in China, we find that promotions within the Chinese Calligraphers Association could significantly increase the trading value, volume, and prices of artworks. Anti-corruption measures targeting “elegant corruption” caused a market collapse for the prestigious artists’ works, indicating bribery’s important role in high-value art demand. Post-policy, artists shift efforts from political activities to marketing and research.

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of entry deregulation in the information intermediary sector, with a focus on China’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) industry. We explore the implications of a market-oriented reform that eliminated entry barriers to the sector and analyze its impacts on EIA report quality, polluting firms, and local residents. Our findings reveal that, although the reform led to a five-fold increase in the number of EIA agencies, it inadvertently resulted in a decline in ser-vice quality. Consequently, firms became more likely to bypass EIA procedures for new projects, ultimately leading to a deterioration in ambient environmental condi-tions, which negatively affected the local population.